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complication 
 
Louis Althusser can be largely credited for the recent renaissance of serious 
readings of Spinoza as providing a metaphysics particularly well-suited for 
contemporary political critique, developing a rigorous rationalism that cuts against the 
grain of abstract individualism, onto-theological humanism, positivist scientism, and 
capitalist ideology.1 And just as Spinoza’s theoretical interventions in political 
discourse were eminently strategic, as in the case of the anonymously-published 
Theologico-Political Treatise, Althusser similarly understood his own interventions to be 
necessarily conditioned by the historical conjunctures that occasioned his writings. His 
Spinozism therefore does not amount to a simple repetition of Spinoza’s concepts; 
rather he repeats them always with a difference, elaborating strategic conceptual 
variations that both illuminate the contours of Spinoza’s systematic philosophy and 
respond effectively to the discursive context of their rearticulation. 
One central and well-known example of such a transposition is Althusser’s 
infamous science-ideology distinction, which is a variation on Spinoza’s theme of 
adequate and inadequate knowledge. In this paper I will argue that this epistemic 
problematic has its metaphysical correlate in another differential repetition, in the 
concept of overdetermination, with which Althusser seeks to articulate the problematic of 
antagonistic social formations. But overdetermination itself as a concept has only 
rarely been thematized. I argue that while the language of ‘overdetermination’ comes 
from psychoanalysis, and it has been variously presented as a Gramscian, Maoist, or 
Lacanian innovation, its real conceptual bases are found in Spinoza’s materialist 
analysis of modal interactions, and situating it within this genealogy clarifies its sense.2 
                                                      
1 Althusser’s Spinozism has been the focus of much recent scholarship. Cf., e.g., Sharp, Hasana. 
Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011; Montag, 
Warren. Althusser and His Contemporaries: Philosophy’s Perpetual War. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2013; Peden, Knox. Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2014; Crisis & Critique 2:2, etc. 
2 Balibar’s tantalizingly brief remarks on overdetermination construe it as primarily inspired by 
Gramscian notions of a decentered social totality. (Balibar, Étienne. “Structural Causality, 
Overdetermination, and Antagonism.” In Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist Theory: Essays 
in the Althusserian Tradition. Eds. Antonio Calliari and David F. Ruccio. Hanover: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1995.) In Chapter 3 of Elliott’s Althusser: The Detour of Theory, he presents overdetermination as 
a specifically Maoist development in the theory of contradiction; and while Elliott rightly emphasizes 
Althusser’s Spinozism elsewhere in the text, Spinoza does not figure into Elliott’s reconstruction of 
this concept. (Elliott, Gregory. Althusser: The Detour of Theory. Boston: Brill, 2006.) Katja Kolšek treats 
overdetermination at some length, but as a ‘paradoxical,’ ‘problematic’ or ‘quasi-concept’ best 
understood along Lacanian psychoanalytic lines (which are, on my reading, quite foreign to 
Althusser’s Spinozist inspiration) as the effect of a ‘parallax’ shift in perspective on what she takes to 
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For Spinoza, modes are complex when they are complicated: that is, when they are 
implicated in a dynamic multiplicity of concrete assemblages or ensembles, none of 
which is sufficient to explain the mode as singularly constituting its essence. But at the 
same time, it is impossible for a mode not to be determined by every assemblage in 
which it is implicated. That is, complex modes are always overdetermined. The 
Spinozist challenge is to reach the point of view of the third kind of knowledge, or 
beatitude, in which a finite mode is grasped in its singularity. This however cannot be 
achieved by way of a ‘subtraction’ of the mode from the milieu of its 
overdetermination. Indeed subtraction leaves us always at the level of inadequate 
knowledge, the abstract perspective of the imagination. Althusser’s insistence on the 
overdetermined character of social modes is designed to prevent us from performing 
such a subtractive abstraction in trying to understand them. 
In the first section of this paper, I will reconstruct some of the salient features 
of what I will call Spinoza’s physics of modes, which will let us see, in the second 
section, how Althusser’s concept of overdetermination repeats this complex physics at 
the level of social formations, in a variation that also seeks to introduce the Marxist 
theme of social antagonism. In fact, as we will see, the couplet 
‘contradiction/overdetermination’ is itself contradictory, and the whole difficulty will 
lie in whether it is possible to recuperate a strong sense of antagonism once 
overdetermination is taken seriously. 
 
the physics of modes 
 
To begin with, what is a mode? Modes constitute one of the central categories 
of Spinoza’s metaphysics, alongside substance and attribute. Spinoza defines 
substance as that which exists in itself and which is conceived through itself. A 
substance’s attribute, he writes, is “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as 
constituting its essence.”3 Modes are then the affections of a substance, the ways of 
being possible for a substance. Modes therefore cannot exist independently; they exist 
and are conceived not in and through themselves, but in and through the substance of 
which they are modifications. In the first 11 propositions of the Ethics, Spinoza shows 
that there can only be one substance, the absolutely infinite being called God or 
nature, which exists necessarily and is expressed in an infinity of attributes, including 
thought and extension.4 As Deleuze writes in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, the Ethics 
                                                      
be the proper object of materialist philosophy (and so of Althusser’s), namely, the void. (Kolšek, 
Katja. “The parallax object of Althusser’s materialist philosophy.” In Encountering Althusser. Eds. 
Katja Diefenbach, Sara R. Farris, Gal Kirn, and Peter D. Thomas. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013.) 
3 Spinoza, Benedict de. Ethics. In Complete Works. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Ed. Michael Morgan. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002. I D4 
4 Spinoza, Ethics I P1-11 
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begins with given substantial attributes and proceeds “as quickly as possible”5 to this 
idea of God, from which everything else follows: in Proposition 16, Spinoza tells us 
that from “the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things 
in infinitely many modes.”6 
The majority of Book I is concerned with little else than establishing precisely 
what is meant by ‘the necessity of the divine nature’, which Spinoza argues is unique 
and absolute. But once he has done away with the quasi-transcendental illusions of an 
anthropomorphic God and a teleologically-organized nature, the rest of the Ethics 
focuses almost exclusively on the physics of determinate and finite modes.7 The finite 
modes that follow from the divine nature are determined, as regards both their 
essence and existence, by God as their efficient cause.8 Moreover, modes are 
necessarily determined to produce the effects they do: they cannot determine 
themselves to produce other effects, and they cannot render themselves 
                                                      
5 Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988. Pg. 111 
6 Spinoza, Ethics I P16 
7 I leave aside here the complex problem posed by the ‘infinite modes’, which Spinoza discusses 
briefly in Ethics I P21-23. Spinoza says that there are both immediate and mediate infinite modes, 
where the first are always produced by the absolute nature of substance, and the second, while also 
having always eternally been produced, are caused by the immediate infinite modes or by other 
mediate infinite modes. Schuller asks Spinoza for examples to clarify what this means, and Spinoza 
responds in Letter 64: “the examples you ask for of the first kind [i.e., immediate infinite modes] are: 
in the case of thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in the case of extension, motion and rest. An 
example of the second kind [i.e., mediate infinite modes] is the face of the whole universe, which, 
although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always the same.” (Spinoza, Benedict de. Letter 64, in 
Complete Works. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Ed. Michael Morgan. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2002.) 
Still, just what Spinoza exactly means, and what conceptual work is done, by the infinite modes 
remains somewhat unclear and has been the focus of several investigations in recent Spinoza 
scholarship. Cf. Huenemann, Charles. “Modes Infinite and Finite in Spinoza’s Metaphysics.” NASS 
Monograph #3 (1995): 3-21; Schmaltz, Tad M. “Spinoza’s Mediate Infinite Mode.” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 35:2 (1997): 199-235; Gabbey, Alan. “Spinoza, infinite modes and the infinitive mood.” 
Studia Spinozana 16 (2008): 41-65; Garrett, Don. “The Essence of the Body and the Part of the Mind 
that is Eternal.” In A Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics. Ed. Olli Koistinen. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009; Melamed, Yitzhak Y. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, especially Chapter 4. 
For the purposes of this essay, I am concerned exclusively with finite and determinate modes, 
and this is what I will intend even when I discuss ‘modes’ without qualification. 
8 Spinoza, Ethics I P25 
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undetermined.9 But the manner in which God constitutes the efficient cause of such 
modal determination is, always, as another mode. For, as Spinoza argues, if a mode’s 
determination followed immediately from the absolute and infinite nature of God, 
that mode would itself be necessarily eternal and infinite; so, any determinate and 
finite mode is “determined to exist and produce an effect by God or an attribute of 
God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate 
existence.”10 That is, insofar as something is finite and determinate, it can only affect 
and be affected by other finite and determinate things. Consequently, we might add a 
corollary to Deleuze’s insight: it is as if Spinoza gets to God as quickly as he can, just 
in order to have done with God as quickly as possible. If we are concerned with finite 
and determinate things – like environments, societies, economies, human beings, 
desires and affects – our analysis will have to bear on other finite and determinate 
modes and the logic of modal interactions. 
Now in Book II, Spinoza indicates the elements of such an analysis at the level 
of bodies, in the so-called ‘physical digression’, de natura corporum. Between 
Propositions 13 and 14, Spinoza introduces new axioms, definitions, and lemmas, 
sketching out the logic of bodily interactions. Individual bodies are modes of one and 
the same extended substance, and so are distinguished from one another not by 
essence but by their characteristic relations of movement and rest, the relative 
relations of speed and slowness maintained between their parts.  The degree of a 
body’s complexity determines the extent of its capacity to affect and be affected by 
other bodies without this characteristic relation being compromised.11 So long as its 
relation remains within the threshold determined by its degree of complexity, a body 
can still be said to retain its nature, or be the same thing, if its parts are replaced, if it 
changes in size or direction, or if it functions as a part within another body’s relation 
of movement and rest. One can thus understand how a single mode, if it is sufficiently 
complex, may be simultaneously implicated in a multiplicity of modal assemblages, 
without its identity being reducible to the way in which it is determined by any one 
assemblage in particular. This feature of sufficiently complex modes clearly applies in 
the case of human beings, which for Spinoza are only notable precisely for their 
complexity: the human body is “affected by external bodies in very many ways,” and 
“can move and dispose external bodies in a great many ways.”12 And it is this 
irreducible character of determinate relations of multiple implication and simultaneous 
affection, natural to complex modes, that Althusser will call overdetermination with 
regard to really existing social modes. 
                                                      
9 Spinoza, Ethics I P26-7 
10 Spinoza, Ethics I P27Dem 
11 Spinoza, Ethics II L1, 4-7 
12 Spinoza, Ethics II Postulates III, VI 
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Why, however, should we call this logic of modal interaction a physics? It is true 
that as a physics it does not possess the ideal reversibility of classical Newtonian 
models. Its epistemological limitations resemble those of chemistry, where the nature 
of an effect only obscurely indicates the natures of the causes involved in its 
production. This is a physics of overlapping and discontinuous systems, open circuits, 
and environs in which, as Prigogine and Stengers write in reference to the post-
Newtonian dynamics of nonlinear systems, “reversibility and determinism apply only 
to simple, limiting cases.”13 Modes are often complex and their interactions become 
increasingly complicated – at the limit, the complications extend to infinity. But even 
the infinite complexity of a system of interactive determinations is only apparently 
chaotic in its effects. And in this physics there is never action ‘at a distance’ – 
assemblages involve and complicate, affect and determine, other modes through the 
intensive plenum of extended substance. Modes are never so pristine as the ideal 
objects of geometry, and their interactions never as simple as the vectors of classical 
physics; in each case, what is at stake is a physics of complication, a dynamics of 
complexity, a strict rationalism of the apparently chaotic.  
A further complication follows from the fact that any idea of the kinds of 
bodies we have been describing also involves the idea of the human body whose mind 
thinks it: one cannot clearly subtract out the nature of one’s own body or mind from 
the idea of the external body. Strictly speaking, in this case what one has is the idea of 
the bodily assemblage involving, at the very least, both one’s own and the external 
body.14 This is the ineradicable problem of the inadequate first kind of knowledge, 
which Spinoza also calls the imagination and which Althusser will reconceive as 
ideology. And if he infamously declares that ‘ideology has no history’, still my own 
inadequate knowledge or ideological understanding surely does: the images of the 
natures of myself and of external bodies that I subtract from the obscure whole of 
this ideal assemblage will be determined according to a series of potentially confused 
ideal and affective associations that have taken shape in the course of my individual 
experiences.15 
                                                      
13 Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers. Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: 
Bantam Books, 1984. Pg. 8. Anticipating where this paper will lead, compare these lines by 
Althusser: “an ‘overdetermined contradiction’ may either be overdetermined in the direction of a historical 
inhibition, a real ‘block’ for the contradiction (for example, Wilhelmine Germany), or in the direction 
of a revolutionary rupture (Russia in 1917), but in neither condition is it ever found in the ‘pure’ state. ‘Purity’ 
itself would be the exception, I agree, but I know of no example to refer to.” (Althusser, Louis. 
“Contradiction and Overdetermination.” In For Marx. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Verso, 2005. 
Pg. 106) 
14 Spinoza, Ethics II P16 
15 Spinoza, Ethics II P18s; P40s; III P57 
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None of this is to deny the possibility of forming adequate knowledge of 
material assemblages that include us, but it is to underscore some of the difficulties 
attending such an effort. And in particular, it highlights the futility of any attempt at 
attaining adequate knowledge by subtraction, that is, by imagining the object of 
knowledge outside its (over)determining milieu. If we want to retain the image of 
physics here, it is because modes as Spinoza has described them function as points of 
articulation and inflection within fields of complex forces and interactions. After all, 
Spinoza tells us, the singular essence of any thing or mode is precisely its conatus, its 
striving to persevere in its being; this goes just as well for ideas as it does for bodies, 
from the simplest to the most complex.16 In this sense, ideas, as existing modes, are 
the objects of a physics of the ideal (which is not the same as an ideal physics). As 
Alexandre Matheron shows in his important study Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, at 
orders of sufficient complexity – and again, human beings are clearly sufficiently 
complex for this – a mode’s striving involves the effort to transform objective 
conditions, the modes constituting its milieu, such that they will naturally tend to 
increase its own power.17 This attempt at transforming external modes is always 
underway at a multiplicity of levels simultaneously, and modes are complicated at 
every level. Am I not immanently involved in the complex efforts to determine reality 
naturally being pursued by capital, the United States, the university, my family, and 
mitochondria? My mind is the idea of the body implicated in all these material 
assemblages and more, but it does not follow that I automatically have adequate 
knowledge of any of them.  
Spinoza argues that it will only be by making a retreat to the greater or lesser 
generality of the common notions that I can begin to form adequate ideas, but by 
definition these cannot be adequate ideas of these particular assemblages.18 The 
common notions constitute the second kind of knowledge: “What is common to all 
things and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of 
any singular thing,” and “can only be conceived adequately.”19 Common notions may 
be organized along on a spectrum, according to which they indicate a maximum or 
minimum of generality; at one end they describe what is common to all modes of a 
given attribute, and at the other what is common to just two modes of an attribute. At 
the latter extreme, the least general common notion of which I can form an adequate 
idea is of my body and one other body. We can say that the less general the common 
notion, the more ‘useful’ it is, since the domain of bodies whose relations it adequately 
expresses is more specifically delimited the less general it is. By contrast, a maximally 
general common notion is almost practically useless: all bodies are modes of 
                                                      
16 Spinoza, Ethics III P7 
17 Matheron, Alexandre. Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. Paris: Minuit, 1969. Chs. 3 and 4  
18 Spinoza, Ethics II P37-40 
19 Spinoza, Ethics II P37; P38 
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extension, involving relations of movement and rest; the universal applicability of a 
concept is at the same time its poverty. But in neither case do common notions 
express the essences of singular things; rather, as Deleuze says, common notions 
express a unity of composition; they are “physico-chemical or biological Ideas rather than 
geometric ones: they present Nature’s unity of composition in its various aspects.”20  
For Spinoza, it is always possible to form common notions, that is, to attain 
adequate knowledge; and that common notions form the basis of reason, which 
consists in regarding things not as contingent but as necessary.21 But whether one 
actually attains adequate knowledge is also subject to the laws of necessity, which 
paradoxically means that it is a matter of having a fortuitous encounter, a joyful 
interaction in which I grasp the necessity of a unity of composition, affirm the power 
of my own mind as a mode of thinking, and recognize the inadequate character of 
what I had previously imagined. And whether this happens does not depend on my 
volition, since for Spinoza the will and understanding are coextensive: I affirm just 
what is involved in the idea I have, whether my idea is adequate or confused.22 In 
order to pass beyond the inadequacy of my imagination, I must be determined to 
think something adequately by external causes that bring me joy and increase my 
power of thinking. Even the autodidact requires a situation in which the physics of 
modes encourages thought, a favorable milieu in which the complex of 
determinations implicates them in a joyful encounter; where the agreement of their 
body and that of another gives rise to the affirmation of a shared unity of 
composition. But this does not always happen, for objective circumstances are not 
always favorable to thought. Adequate knowledge might never ‘take hold’, as 
Althusser sometimes likes to put it. As Spinoza writes: “When we say that a man rests 
in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do not, on that account, say that he is 
certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he rests in false ideas because there 
are no causes to bring it about that his imagination wavers.”23 This, again, is the 
problem of ideology: my remaining within inadequate knowledge must be interrupted 
from without, for I cannot will knowledge beyond what I already happen to know.  
But once I have some adequate knowledge, I can proceed all the way to what 
Spinoza calls beatitude, the third kind of knowledge, in which I affirm the necessity not 
only of the relations involved in a unity of composition but of singular things. 
Beatitude consists in grasping individual modes as fully necessary from the 
perspective of their production, which involves a total disavowal of contingency as a 
third quasi-transcendental illusion (after an anthropomorphic God and a teleological 
Nature). Both common notions and knowledge of the third kind are systems of 
                                                      
20 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 115 
21 Spinoza, Ethics II P44 
22 Spinoza, Ethics II P49 
23 Spinoza, Ethics II P49s 
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adequate ideas involving necessity, but the former bear on relations of composition 
and the latter on singular essences. We can then say that these illusions are operations 
of the imagination: the first is a projection, the second an inversion, and the third a 
subtraction which yields images of things only by stripping them of their 
determination, extracting them from the order of production, from the actual order of 
effective reality. But beatitude is knowledge of things precisely as determined, as 
necessarily produced in all their complications: it is the joy that just is the power of 
thinking. 
 
social formations and overdetermination 
 
When he wrote “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in 1962, Althusser was 
more than a little bit anxious to distinguish Marxism from Hegelianism; a significant 
part of the essay involves arguing for the uniqueness of the Marxist dialectic. 
Althusser was particularly troubled by the inadequacy of the metaphors of ‘inverting 
Hegel’ and of ‘extracting the rational kernel from the mystical shell’ – which left one 
with, respectively, just Hegelian dialectics again, or else nothing at all.24 The piece 
belongs in a curious genre of postwar French thought marked by its utter disdain for 
anything called Hegelian.25 Althusser’s concern in rejecting the specifically Hegelian 
concept of contradiction in trying to elaborate a systematic Marxist philosophy is very 
close to what Deleuze, in Difference & Repetition, referred to as the “insipid 
monocentricity”26 of Hegelian dialectics: its tendency to reduce real complexities to a 
single essential determination. At the very least, Althusser argues, the univocal 
character of Hegelian contradiction is inappropriate for an analysis of historically 
                                                      
24 Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination” 89-94 
25 The longer story here is best told by Elliott in Chapter 2 of Althusser: The Detour of Theory. There we 
learn that in the early 1960s, the Partie communiste français had launched an investigation into what 
went wrong with that whole Stalinist scene, which culminated in a piece published in the Cahiers 
communistes entitled “The Tasks of Communist Philosophers and the Critique of Stalin’s Errors” 
[“Les tâches des philosophes communistes et la critique des erreurs philosophiques de Staline”]. The conclusions 
reached and presented by Maurice Thorez and Roger Garaudy criticized Stalin’s Dialectical and 
Historical Materialism for being insufficiently Hegelian, and suggested that the way forward for 
communist philosophers would have to involve a positive reappraisal of the ‘negation of the 
negation’. Althusser’s “Contradiction and Overdetermination” and “On the Materialist Dialectic” 
were quite explicitly critiques and repudiations of this official party line, published even while he 
remained a member of the PCF. (Elliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory, 56-60) On Althusser’s 
tortured relationship with the equally torturous efforts of the ‘de-stalinization’ of the PCF, see also 
Chapters 5 and 6 of Peden’s Spinoza Contra Phenomenology, esp. pgs. 133-142, 151-157. 
26 Deleuze, Gilles. Difference & Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994. Pg. 263 
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concrete social formations, which are highly complicated modes of existence and thus 
will only be inadequately or ideologically grasped if they are understood as the 
phenomenal expression of any one assemblage; this would be subtraction. In the place 
of this reductive tendency, Althusser draws on the Spinozist physics of modes we 
have just been describing to advance a provisional concept of overdetermination in 
which multiple levels of effectivity are simultaneously operative.27 
Althusser’s refrain is constant: Marx gave us the elements for a real science of 
history, breaking with idealist philosophies and ideologies of history.28 This involves 
not only the introduction of new concepts, but new relations between the concepts 
with which we seek to grasp social modes and their historical trajectories. What we are 
                                                      
27 One last point before leaving behind the question of Hegel and Hegelianism. If Althusser’s 
avowed anti-Hegelianism is particularly pronounced in this essay, it is first due to political 
circumstances (see note 25 above), but also because he might be called a ‘recovering Hegelian’. After 
all, this is a thinker whose master’s thesis, “On Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel”, features 
lines like: “the world has become Hegelian to the extent that Hegel was a truth capable of becoming 
a world,” and the admission that Hegel’s system, with all its extravagant claims, is “presented so 
compellingly and with such rigor that the possibility of its falling apart would be unthinkable, if 
history did not offer us the spectacle of its disintegration.” (Althusser, Louis. “On Content in the 
Thought of G.W.F. Hegel.” In The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings. Ed. François Matheron. Trans. 
G.M. Goshgarion. New York: Verso, 1997. Pgs. 36, 99). His review of Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture 
de Hegel, “Man, That Night,” positions itself not as a critique of Hegel but as a defense of a more 
complete Hegel, against the one-sidedness of existentialist or subjectivist readings of Hegel: if 
Kojève had emphasized that ‘substance is a subject’, he missed Hegel’s deeper point that ‘substance 
is also a subject’. Finally the 1950 essay “The Return to Hegel”, which is somewhat more sociological 
in tone, distinguished between the revolutionary materialist and bourgeois idealist tendencies of 
Hegelian thought and its reception. (Althusser, The Spectre of Hegel) 
I tend to think that the kind of ‘generalized anti-Hegelianism’ that Deleuze describes in his 
Preface to Difference & Repetition is overstated, if only because it is always a certain Hegel that is taken 
as ‘the enemy’, and indeed as the kind of enemy who a different Hegel would have also targeted. In 
the case concerning us here, it is noteworthy, for instance, that it is quite possible to read Althusser’s 
elaboration of overdetermination as an attempt at being more Hegelian than Hegel, rather than as a 
flight from Hegelianism. To insist on the real depth of complexity, to refuse to allow for the 
reduction of so many different determinations to a single ‘essential’ one – is this not after all the 
meaning of the Hegelian dictum that ‘the true is the whole,’ the critique of every such analysis as 
‘one-sided’? In other words, Althusser is ‘anti-Hegelian’ to the precise extent that Hegel’s own 
treatment of history is where he is at his least Hegelian, his least dialectical, his most one-sided. 
28 Even though he admits that Marx’s ‘rupture’ or ‘epistemological break’ was never ‘complete’: “It 
was only tendential.” (Althusser, Louis. “Philosophy and Marxism.” In Philosophy of the Encounter: 
Later Writings, 1978-1987. Ed. François Matheron and Oliver Corpet. Trans. G.M. Goshgarion. New 
York: Verso, 2006. Pg. 258)  
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dealing with is a new problematic, that is, a new way of articulating the necessity of an 
object of knowledge, or a new system of concepts.29 As Althusser writes in On the 
Reproduction of Capitalism, Marx saw that the notion of ‘society’ was non-scientific or 
ideological, and introduced in its place a new problematic, a new conceptual 
constellation involving ‘social formations’ and ‘modes of production’: “‘social 
formation’ designates every ‘concrete society’ that has historical existence and is 
individualized, so that it is distinct from other societies contemporaneous with it, and is 
also distinct from its own past, by virtue of the mode of production dominant in it.”30 
A mode of production is itself a contradictory unity of the forces and relations of 
production. Moreover, Althusser argues that there are always multiple modes of 
production in a given social formation, but that one of these is dominant at any given 
point; and a social formation is individuated as the antagonistic or contradictory unity 
in which one mode of production happens to be dominant.  
If this is a ‘scientific’ advance, on the Spinozist model we have explored, it 
would have to be because we are able to grasp adequately some common notions 
particular to social modes of existence. Consider Marx’s discussion, in Chapter 7 of 
the first volume of Capital, of the labor-process, in which he begins by laying out what 
is common to all modes of production: namely, raw materials, means of production, 
and the purposive exercise of labor-power. Only subsequently, having laid out this 
concept of production from the perspective of its unity of composition, does he turn 
to the specifically capitalist mode of production, which involves a formal 
contradiction between the forces of production and their relations.31 And this is how 
Althusser tries to hold together the two sides of the problem: on the one hand, a 
social formation is overdetermined by the multiplicity of modes of production that it 
involves; on the other hand, there is an objective contradiction at the heart of any 
social formation whose dominant mode of production is capitalist. But nothing in the 
social formation is fully determined by any one contradiction, nothing is its pure 
expression; as Althusser puts it, “the apparently simple contradiction is always 
overdetermined.”32  
                                                      
29 N.B. It is possible for old concepts to be retained in a new scientific understanding, on condition 
that their sense is transformed to the extent that they play a new role in the new problematic. This 
concept of ‘problematic’ in Althusser’s work came from his early collaborator Jacques Martin. Cf. 
Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology, 139. 
30 Althusser, Louis. On the Reproduction of Capitalism. Trans. G.M. Goshgarion. New York: Verso, 
2014. Pg. 19  
31 Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume 1. Trans. Ben Fowkes. New York: 
Penguin, 1971. Ch. 7. Similarly it would be possible to read Marx’s concept of surplus-value as a 
common notion, belonging to the new problematic of the exploitation of labor-power, by means of 
which he clarified the political economists’ confused categories of ‘profit’, ‘rent’, ‘interest’, etc. 
32 Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination” 106 
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A social formation and its elements are always complicated in the Spinozist 
sense, and Althusser describes the kinds of material ensembles that have real effects in 
these complex determinations: superstructural assemblages like ideologies and 
political movements, but also the sociohistorical relations internal to the state along 
with its its international situation. These are complex, mutually determining and co-
implicating relations, dynamic logics of modal interactions, and it is the specific 
effectivity of these modal assemblages that would be the object of a physics of social 
formations. For there is no question of subtracting them from their field of effectivity 
and understanding anything about them thereby; they only exist as produced and 
insofar as they have determinate effects. And although, as Althusser says, the theory 
of the specific effectivity of these ensembles remains largely unelaborated, he gestures 
at the beatitude such a physics promises: “it is by formulating their effectivity that 
their essence can be attained.”33 By grasping the real and effective determining power of 
these social modes, in the way they complicate others, we pass from the second to the 
third kind of knowledge, identifying not just the unity of composition of social 
formations in general but the very reality of the material existences that comprise 
them here and now. And to gain this kind of understanding would surely be joyful. 
                                                      
33 Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination” 114 
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